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22850	7590	09/21/2009	EXAMINER	
OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P. 1940 DUKE STREET ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314				DANIEL JR, WILLIE J
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1                   RECORD OF ORAL HEARING

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3                   UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

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6                   BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS  
7                   AND INTERFERENCES

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10                  Ex parte TOSHIKUMI YAMAMOTO

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Appeal 2009-003325  
Application 09/926,434  
Technology Center 2600

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Oral Hearing Held: August 12, 2009

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23                  Before KENNETH W. HAIRSTON, JOHN C. MARTIN and BRADLEY

24                  W. BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judges

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26                  ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT:

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28

JAMES J. KULBASKI, ESQUIRE  
OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.  
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The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Wednesday, August  
34                  12, 2009, commencing at 10:45 a.m., at The U.S. Patent and Trademark

35                  Office, 600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia, before Ashorethea

36                  Cleveland, Notary Public.

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1           THE USHER: Good morning. Calendar Number 38, Appeal Number  
2 2009-003325. Mr. Kulbaski.

3           JUDGE HAIRSTON: Good morning, counselor.

4           MR. KULBASKI: Good morning. My name is James Kulbaski. I  
5 am here on behalf of the Applicant.

6           This morning's case is very straightforward. It relates to a mobile  
7 communication terminal. This type of terminal is typically used with a  
8 bluetooth protocol but other protocols may be used.

9           There's one independent claim, claim 24. It recites a mobile  
10 communication terminal and it includes a number of elements, a first  
11 interface for making radio communication with a mobile communication  
12 network. So, in this case, the phone can call to the wireless provider. A  
13 second interface for making radio communication with the car mounted  
14 electronic device and that's essentially a bluetooth type interface which is  
15 part of the cell phone; and again, other communication protocols can be used  
16 for that; a connection control section for controlling connection to the car  
17 mounted electronic device, and then the manner in which this device  
18 operates as set forth in the last paragraph.

19           The feature which I'll be talking about today pertains to the last four  
20 lines which state that the connection control section disconnects the  
21 connection with the car mounted electronic device and sets the  
22 communication mode in its own communication mode if no packet which is  
23 periodically output from the car mounted electronic device for  
24 acknowledgement of the connection is received for a predetermined time  
25 period.

1        There are two rejections which are being appealed, both prior-art  
2 rejections, 103 obviousness rejection and the 102 anticipation rejection.

3        The 103 rejection is in view of three references, Chennakeshu, Raith  
4 and Chen; and as explained on page six of the Appeal Brief, the Examiner  
5 acknowledges that Chennakeshu and Raith don't disclose the feature of  
6 disconnection as claimed.

7        So, for this feature, he relies on Chen; and it says that Chen discloses  
8 the feature of disconnected electronic device and references column nine,  
9 line 51 through column ten, line 25.

10       So, for the obviousness rejection, the Examiner is admitting that a  
11 feature is not in the first two references and relies on a specific portion of  
12 Chen.

13       If you look through column nine, line 51 through column ten, line 25,  
14 it does not have the feature explained to be missing from the other  
15 references.

16       What is disclosed at the top paragraph of column ten is that -- there's  
17 an acknowledgement packet sent. Every eighth packet -- if there's a  
18 disconnect, there's -- no acknowledgement packets sent. No  
19 acknowledgement means no more new packets are transmitted.

20       So, the 103 rejection appears to be clearly erroneous. I just don't see  
21 how any feature related to the claim limitation that we're talking to is in that  
22 prior art. It was addressed with the Examiner and he could do nothing more  
23 than point to a couple of paragraphs in the reference and they don't have the  
24 relevancy.

1       The second rejection is a 102 anticipation rejection in view of  
2 Larsson. Again, the feature which is missing from Larsson is the manner of  
3 disconnection.

4       What the Examiner relies on throughout prosecution and the Appeal  
5 Brief is column seven, lines 35 through 41; and the claim makes clear that  
6 the disconnection is controlled by the mobile phone, and what the Examiner  
7 is citing at column seven, lines 35 through 41 -- it says right at line 35. Step  
8 340 in figure three is controlled out by the car kit.

9       So, we are saying that our control is by essentially the phone. What  
10 the Examiner has relied on is something by the car kit.

11       JUDGE HAIRSTON: Granted that most of this reference is devoted  
12 to the car kit being the master and controlling everything -- but if you  
13 continue reading in the second paragraph of column eight, there's one  
14 instance whereby the handset is listening for something coming from the car  
15 unit and if it doesn't receive it within a certain amount of time then the  
16 headset can disconnect, and that's what you're claiming.

17       MR. KULBASKI: It is true that column eight has that feature but  
18 that's described with respect to park mode and the reference doesn't say what  
19 happens when there's a phone conversation occurring and how the  
20 disconnect occurs in that time period.

21       JUDGE HAIRSTON: The claim is pretty broad. I mean, it doesn't  
22 limit what kind of mode you're in. The claim is not limited to a specific  
23 mode. Cell phones can go into quite a few different modes, and, in this park  
24 mode, if you read that second paragraph in column eight, it says, if the  
25 headset does not receive a message for some period of time, it automatically

1 deactivates the hands-free mode. That's pretty much on point to what you're  
2 claiming; isn't it?

3 MR. KULBASKI: Again, that quotation is limited to the park mode  
4 and if the phone is being operated and used in ordinary mode and a person  
5 walks away.

6 JUDGE HAIRSTON: Granted; but the claim is really not limited to a  
7 specific hands-free mode. It's still hands-free. Even in the park mode, it's  
8 still hands-free. Granted this reference gives the master control to the car  
9 unit in every instance, but this one snippet inside Larsson gives the headset  
10 control that one instance, and we think it reads on it.

11 Granted your claim is broad and granted Larsson gives the car unit  
12 complete control but there's this one instance there. The cell unit actually  
13 controls.

14 MR. KULBASKI: I have nothing further.

15 JUDGE HAIRSTON: Okay. Thank you, counsel.

16 MR. KULBASKI: Thank you very much.

17 (Whereupon, at approximately 10:55 a.m., the proceedings were  
18 concluded.)